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INTRODUCTION
Since the Great Depression,  Canada and the United States have used
different  methods  to realize  the same  policy  objectives  of raising dairy farm
incomes and stabilizing milk prices.  The "orderly milk marketing"  conditions
created  in both countries isolated  domestic milk markets from world markets.
Consequently there were few dairy trade disputes before Canada and the United
States negotiated the Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement.
Markets  in North America,  including  agricultural  markets,  have be-
come more integrated as a result of the North American Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA) and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).  The broad
purpose of these agreements is to provide a framework for long-term reform of
trade and  domestic  policies by increasing  market orientation  to  enhance  and
stabilize incomes.  However, the economy wide market-oriented approach con-
flicts directly with the interventionist and isolationist approach used to enhance
and stabilize incomes of primary dairy producers.  The conflicting approaches
have produced  more frequent dairy trade disputes.  The purpose of this paper is
to review dairy disputes related to the NAFTA with the objective of describing
the context in which these disputes have  occurred.254  NAFTA  - Report Card on Agriculture
This paper is organized into four sections.  The next section provides a
background discussion of domestic dairy and trade policies in the United States
and Canada.  The third section identifies the salient features of three dairy trade
disputes.  It includes  a description  of the  key issues, the initiator of the  action,
the action taken, the process of dispute analysis and the outcome of the dispute
resolution process.  The last  section summarizes  and concludes  the paper.
BACKGROUND
The origins of current dairy trade disputes stem in part from the desire
to  prevent a repeat of the trade wars  during  the 1930s and the World War that
followed.  The collapse of world trade during the  1930s made a lasting impact
on  the  negotiators  of multilateral  trade  agreements  following  the War.  The
underpinnings  of the GATT date from this era, when many countries, including
Canada and the United States, pursued "beggar-thy-neighbor" policies by erect-
ing high and discriminatory barriers  to trade.  The resolution to problems  cre-
ated by this policy approach  and the underlying philosophy of the GATT is that
open markets,  non-discrimination  and global competition are conducive to the
national welfare  of all economies.
Nevertheless,  Canada and the United States continue to maintain large
dairy trade barriers,  as  do most developed Organization  for Economic Coop-
eration  and Development  (OECD)  countries.  Significant  exceptions  include
New  Zealand,  and  to a  lesser extent Australia.  Trade  barriers  are used  with
significant intervention  in the  domestic market  to achieve  a variety  of policy
objectives  including  income support, producer equity,  price enhancement  and
price/income  stability.
Protection
Table 1 summarizes producer subsidy equivalents (PSE) and consumer
subsidy  equivalents  (CSE) for  some OECD  countries involved  in dairy  trade
disputes.  The  most protected  OECD  dairy  sector  in terms  of PSE is  Japan,
followed by Canada, the  European Union  (EU)and the United States.  Table  1
also ranks the European Union at the OECD average level of producer subsidy
equivalents  with the United States slightly below and Canada slightly above.
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The negative CSE values  in Table 1 reveal that consumers  and taxpay-
ers pay for these interventions  (a negative  subsidy can be interpreted  as a tax).
It is necessary  to recognize the transfer from consumers  and taxpayers  to pro-
ducers  to calculate  changes  in social  welfare  resulting  from trade liberaliza-
tion.  Gains to consumers and taxpayers through lower prices and expenditures
are measured against producer losses in prices and income.  Producer transfers
are fundamental  to the political economy  of trade liberalization  and domestic
policy reform.  The benefits of domestic market and trade  distortions  are  fo-
cused on a small subset of the population (producers).  In contrast, the costs of
distortions  are diffused across a much broader segment of the population (con-
sumers, taxpayers).  The focused benefits/diffused costs paradigm suggests that
producers have more incentive to organize  and lobby on their own behalf and
thus have more political clout in dairy policy debates.
Comparing the "Milk" versus "All PSE Commodities" columns in Table
1  highlights another important facet of U.S./Canadian dairy trade disputes.  Dairy
industries in both countries received more protection than their overall agricul-
tural  sectors  which are  both well below the OECD average  in terms  of PSE.
This suggests an important tension underlying Canadian  and United States at-
titudes toward dairy vis-a-vis general agricultural trade liberalization.  As well,
Table  1 indicates  that the level of dairy  PSE in Canada and the United  States
has declined since  1992-94 to 1995,  due in large part to the GATT agreement.
Canada  and the  United States would  gain from multilateral  increased market
access  and reduced  export distortions  in grains,  oilseeds,  and  livestock prod-
ucts.  However, this would likely generate producer losses in dairy, poultry, and
eggs in Canada and dairy and sugar in the United States.
In addition to the political economy  tradeoffs  within  the agricultural
sector (as well as between producers and consumers), dairy trade tensions arise
from two other fundamental  forces:  multi-lateral  versus bilateral trade  agree-
ments and differences  in the nature of domestic dairy interventions.  In particu-
lar, the interface of domestic policies and multi- and bilateral trade policies are
increasingly important  sources of U.S.-Canada dairy trade tensions.
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Policy Similarities: Price Supports, Border Protections, and Export
Subsidies
Dairy policy  in Canada and the United  States is similar.  Both coun-
tries use price support and purchase programs to maintain domestic prices above
world price levels and to provide income support.  The effect of these programs
are included in the OECD PSE and GATT aggregate measures of support (AMS)
which must be phased down 20 percent by 2000.  Both the United States and
Canada use export subsidies to balance domestic markets at prices above world
price levels  by moving  excess  production  "off-shore."  Export  subsidization
was reduced 36 percent in value terms  and 21percent in quantity terms under
the  1994 GATT agreement.  Table  2 summarizes  the GATT quantity commit-
ments to reduced dairy export subsidies.  Under the GATT,  the United States
and Canada are permitted to subsidize a significant quantity of exports of skim
milk powder (and butter by the United States).  However, the EU dominates the
quantity of subsidized exports permitted under the GATT.
Another  key  similarity  concerns  border  protection,  in  particular  the
import tariffs and quotas  that comprise the GATT tariff rate quotas.  The  1994
GATT  increased  access  commitments  are  summarized  in Tables  3 (reduced
import  tariffs)  and Table  4 (increased  import quotas).  While "with-in quota"
tariffs  are  generally  small,  the  over quota tariffs  are  large  (and,  essentially
prohibitive),  especially for Japan, the EU, Canada and the United States.  These
prohibitive  over-quota tariffs represent  an ongoing  source  of dairy trade  ten-
sions  in  the GATT  agreement  as  they  essentially  limit  imports  to  the quota
levels.  As to the quota levels, Table 4 indicates that aside from European Union
and  the United  States  (cheese,  butter  and  skim  milk powder)  commitments,
there is very little change in access for these major products for Japan, Canada
and Mexico.  This partly reflects  the fact that these latter countries  imported
more than 5 percent of domestic consumption in the GATT base period (1986-
90).
Policy Similarities/Differences:  Classified  Pricing
Both the United States and Canada employ similar classified pricing to
enhance  producer revenue  (price discrimination)  at the expense  of consumers
in certain commodity markets (generally the fluid and or soft product markets).
In the United States, classified pricing is regulated under federal and California
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milk marketing  orders  (MMO).  Federal MMO  employ four classes  of milk
utilization: Class I (fluid or beverage milk),  Class II (soft manufactured prod-
ucts such as cream cheese,  yogurts,  fluid creams,  etc.), Class III (cheese)  and
Class IV (Class IIIa before the recent federal MMO "reforms":  skim milk pow-
der and butter). California MMO pricing is similar, with Class  1 (fluid), Class
2 (soft), Class 3 (frozen),  Class 4a (SMP/butter) and Class 4b (cheese).
Classified pricing enhances revenue by charging higher prices in price
inelastic markets.  Higher prices  are charged  for raw  milk used in Class  I (1)
and Class II (2 and 3) under the federal (California) MMO.  Classified pricing
therefore raises milk prices and increases milk production in regions with high
Class I/II utilization, decreases Class I/II consumption (due to the higher prices)
and results in more manufacturing milk (Class III/IV (4a/4b)) milk compared
to the  absence  of classified  pricing.  The  extra production  of manufacturing
milk tends to lower the price of manufacturing  products,  hence penalizing  re-
gions with low Class I/II utilization.
In addition, both federal and California MMO prices for Class IV (IIIa/
4a) are administered  at levels that are generally below the price for milk used in
cheese  (Class III/4b).  With an attractive processor  margin to attract milk into
Class IV (IIIa under the old FMMO/4a in California)  and with a price for skim
milk powder  set by Commodity  Credit Corporation  well  above world market
levels, this pricing is designed to short the domestic  cheese  sector.  Given in-
elastic  cheese demand, shorting the domestic cheese market can generate Class
III revenue enhancement that more than offsets the milk producer revenues lost
on the Class IV (IIIa/4a) market.
Revenues  from all utilizations  are  pooled so that producers receive  a
"blend price" based on regional MMO milk utilization.  This distribution scheme
is the source of serious regional dairy disputes in the U.S. dairy sector.  Regions
with low Class I/II utilization  suffer milk price and revenue losses  due to the
increased milk supply, lower Class I/II consumption,  increased manufacturing
milk and resulting lower manufacturing milk prices that determine  the bulk of
their milk revenues.  In contrast,  regions with high Class I/II utilizations reap
most of the benefits of the classified pricing while the costs of the intervention
are passed off to consumers and the manufacturing  regions.
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Canadian  classified  pricing  works  similarly,  with  the twist that  pro-
duction quotas  allow  a  classified price  pooling  over  milk utilizations  within
quota to be separated  from milk utilizations  over-quota.  This  characteristic  is
essential  to the two-tiered export  pricing scheme  implemented  by Canada in
1996. Canadian classified  pricing includes:  Class  1 (fluid milk and cream for
the domestic market);  Class  2 (industrial  milk for the domestic ice cream, yo-
gurt and sour cream markets);  Class 3 (industrial milk for the domestic cheese
markets);  and Class 4 (industrial milk  for the domestic  butter,  condensed  and
evaporated  milk,  milk  powders  and other  markets.  The  two-tiered  (domestic
versus export) nature of Canadian classified pricing occurs explicitly in Class 5
(Special Milk Class) items. These classes are defined as raw milk used to pro-
duce  the following  items:
Class  5(a), cheese ingredients for further processing for the domestic
and export markets;
Class  5(b),  all other dairy products  for further processing for the
domestic and export  markets;
Class  5(c), domestic and export activities  of the confectionery  sector;
Class 5(d),  specific negotiated exports  including cheese
under quota destined for the United States and United
Kingdom,  evaporated milk,  whole milk powder and niche
markets;
Class 5(e),  surplus removal.
Policy Similarities/Differences: The Export Implications of Classified
Pricing
The export implications and GATT legality of classified pricing schemes
in  the United  States  and Canada  are  a  contentious  issue.  Many  consider  the
cross-subsidization  of manufactured milk and product prices to be implicit export
subsidies  maintained  and  administered  via government  intervention.  Clearly
the  recent WTO  Panel rulings  with respect to the  Canadian Class  5d  and 5e
pricing supports this view. The explicit two-tier aspect of this pricing - that is,
these lower valued classes were clearly targeted to the export versus the domestic
market - was particularly damning. What is not so clear, as in the case of U.S.
classified pricing,  is  whether  it is  the two-tier aspect  alone  that causes  these
classified pricing schemes  to violate  GATT export subsidy commitments.  Cox
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et al. (2000) estimate that complete removal of federal and California classified
pricing would increase cheese prices $4/cwt-$6/cwt and skim milk powder price
$10/cwt-$15/cwt  under competitive market assumptions. This is a measure  of
the  cross-subsidy  from the  fluid/soft  markets  to  the  manufactured  product
markets caused by U.S. classified pricing. This is clearly an implicit consumption
subsidy  to  the manufactured  products.  While  these  implicit cross-subsidies
generally  do  not make the  United States  competitive  in world markets,  they
likely are  sufficient  to move  products  across regions  within the United States
and perhaps even into Canada. In any case, these consumption subsidies reduce
the costs of subsidized exports (i.e., they lower the difference between domestic
and world prices) and add some degree of price competitiveness to offset within
or over quota import tariffs.
To the extent these cross-subsidized products are exported, the implicit
consumption subsidies associated  with U.S. classified pricing become implicit
export subsidies.  The big difference  with the Canadian Class 5d/5e  scheme is
that these implicit  subsidies  are not targeted specifically  to the export market;
that is, they are not two-tiered as the domestic and export price are both cross-
subsidized.  The GATT legality  of this type of classified pricing  has not been
assessed by the WTO. However,  there are some indications  that the European
Union could make this an issue in the next Round of WTO negotiations (Dobson,
1999b).
Policy Differences:  Milk Production Quotas
Lastly, one key difference  in U.S. and Canadian dairy policy concerns
the use  of milk production  quotas,  a quantity versus price related policy tool.
Canada shares this approach with the EU and California  milk marketing order
dairy policies.  Production quotas raise the issue of quota rents (the monetized
value of the right to produce milk in a heavily protected domestic milk sector)
and  the  property  rights  that tend  to  become  associated  with this  type  of
intervention. Inter- and intra-regional pressure to expand milk production beyond
current quota levels is motivated by size economies (production  quotas tend to
inhibit  the  adoption  of  size  related,  efficiency  enhancing  technology),
interregional  competition  (between  Canadian regions  why should  the prairie
provinces import dairy products from Quebec if they can be produced locally?)
and with U.S. regions (California, Northwest, Northeast, etc.), and dissatisfaction
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with the historically based original quota allocation. Liberalization (elimination
or expansion)  of milk production  quotas raises  issues  of compensation  and
transition paths. Similar issues characterize  the EU milk production quota debate.
CASES
Dairy trade  disputes  in North America typically  involve  Canada  and
the United  States  with  the United  States  initiating  the dispute  against  some
aspect  of Canadian  dairy  policy.  Since  1986 there  have  been  at least  three
differences  of opinion  between  the  two  countries regarding  dairy trade.  The
first was the GATT dispute over yogurt and ice cream.  Later, the United States
challenged Canada's ability to convert import quotas to tariffs under the NAFTA.
The most recent dispute  challenged Canada's  two-tiered  pricing system under
the GATT/WTO.  This section reviews each of these disputes using a case study
methodology.  For each dispute, the focus is  on the initiator of the action, the
action  taken,  the  process  of the  dispute  analysis  and  the  outcome  of the
application process.
Ice  Cream  and  Yogurt GATT  Dispute
The Canadian government  was requested  to add ice cream and yogurt
to  its Import  Control  List before  1988.  Ice  cream  and  yogurt had  not been
included on the List as the quantity imported was negligible relative to domestic
consumption.  During the late 1980s, however, there was an increased awareness
about the Canadian market in the United States,  largely because of the CUSTA
negotiations.  Processors in the United States realized that Canadian tariffs  (at
the  time  about  15  percent)  on  ice cream and  yogurt would be coming down.
The  tariff reduction  and  low  manufacturing  milk prices  in the United  States
relative  to Canada  implied  a  potential  for yogurt  and ice  cream exports  into
Canada (Matte,  1997).  To  preclude  this outcome,  the  Canadian  government
added ice cream and yogurt to its Import Control List on 28 January  1988'
Specifically,  the following  items were added to the Import Control List:
HS code  Item
2104.00.00.10  Ice Cream Novelties
2105.00.00.20  Ice Cream
2105.00.00.90  Other Ice Cream
2105.00.00.90  Ice Milk Novelties
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A notice issued pursuant to the Canadian Export and Imports Act, dated
March 25,  1988 stated that import permits were required for any imports of ice
cream and yogurt.  It required importers seeking permits for any of the restricted
products for the remainder of 1988 to document their import performance  with
respect to these products in 1984,  1985,  1986 and 1987.  No quota levels were
established for  1988.  Permits were requested for 3,536 tons of ice cream and
for 2,279 tons of yogurt.  Permits were issued for 349 tons of ice cream and for
1,212 tons of yogurt.
During  September  and October  1988,  the  United States  and  Canada
held  consultations  pursuant  to Article  XXII  2 of the GATT  on quantitative
restrictions  imposed by Canada  on  imports  of various  ice  cream and  yogurt
products.  As these consultations  did not resolve the matter, the United States,
in a communication  dated 8 December  1988, requested a panel be established
to examine  the matter under Article XXIII:2 of the GATT.
The United States considered the Canadian restrictions to be inconsistent
with the obligations of Canada under the General Agreement.  In particular, the
permit system and quotas violated the prohibition of import restrictions in Article
XI: 1, and could not be justified as an exception under Article XI:2.3 In addition,
the  implementation  of  the restrictions  was  inconsistent  with Articles  X  and
XIII.  This infringement of the provisions of the General Agreement constituted
prima facie a  case of nullification  or impairment  of benefits  accruing  to  the
United  States  under the  GATT.  The United  States  requested  the  Panel  to
2105.00.00.90  Ice Milk
2105.00.00.90  Other Ice Milk
2105.00.00.90  Products Manufactured  Mainly
of Ice Cream or Ice Milk
2106.90.90.00  Ice Cream Mix
2106.90.90.00  Ice Milk Mix
0403.10.00.00  Yogurt
2  Article  XXII provides  for consultations  between  parties that have  a trade dispute,
which is a necessary condition for invoking Article XXIII.  Article XXIII is the GATT's
dispute  settlement provision,  allowing parties  to address actions  that are perceived  to
nullify or impair a concession.
3 Article XI requires  the elimination  of quantitative restrictions.  Exceptions  such as
XI.2.c.i  applied.
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recommend  that Canada eliminate  its quotas  and permit scheme on imports
of ice cream  and yogurt.
Canada maintained its placement of quantitative import restrictions
on  ice  cream  and  yogurt  were  consistent  with  Canada's  rights  and
obligations under Article XI:2(c)(i).  The administration of these restrictions
was  fully consistent with Articles X  and XIII.  Thus,  Canada's  actions did
not nullify  or impair  any  benefits  accruing  to  the  United  States.  Canada
requested the  Panel  to  find that the  quantitative  restrictions  on ice cream
and  yogurt  were  consistent  with  Canada's  rights  and  obligations  under
Article XI, as  well as Articles X  and XIII.
The United States recalled that Article XI: 1 prohibited the restriction
of imports  regardless  of whether  such  restrictions  were  made  effective
through  quotas,  import licenses  or  other measures.  The Canadian  import
permit  scheme  thus  fell  within  these  provisions.  The  permit  scheme
established  by  the  Export  and  Import  Permits  Act  and  the  Notices  to
Importers  operated  to restrict imports.  Permits were  not freely granted to
all  qualified importers and were valid only  for a limited time.  Depending
on  the  means  of transportation  involved,  importers  sometimes  could  not
obtain  a valid permit  until the  goods were  in transit.  The uncertainty  and
limitations imposed by the scheme could deter exporters from undertaking
the planning, promotion and investment  activities necessary to develop  and
expand markets  in  Canada  for their products.  The  permits  therefore  had
restrictive  effects on trade in addition  to those caused by the quota,  and in
the absence of justified quotas, could not be reconciled  with Article XI.
Canada maintained  that the permit system was not trade restrictive.
Import permits were readily granted to applicants who qualified by meeting
certain  criteria,  the principal  one being  historical import performance  and
reasonable  allowance  was  made  for  new  entrants.  Permitted  imports  in
1988  exceeded  the import level of the previous  year.
On  12  September  1989  the  Panel  concluded  that  Canada's
restrictions  on the  importation  of ice cream  and  yogurt  were inconsistent
with Article XI: 1 and could not be justified under the provisions  of Article
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XI:2(c)(i).  In particular,  the Panel found that ice cream and yogurt did not
meet the requirements of Article XI:2(c)(i) for "like products"  "in any form"
to Canadian raw milk because they did not compete directly with raw milk
nor would their free importation be likely to render ineffective the Canadian
measures on raw milk production.  The Panel also found that restrictions  of
imports  of ice cream  and  yogurt  were  not necessary  to  enforce  the  milk
supply  management system.  Canada  was requested  either to terminate  the
restrictions or to bring  them into conformity  with the  GATT.  Because the
Uruguay Round was well underway  and was mandated to deal  specifically
with  agricultural  trade,  Canada  decided  to withhold  action  on the  report
pending the final outcome of that current round of the GATT talks.  Canada
later converted  the  import restrictions  to tariffs  that offered  an equivalent
level  of protection just  as they  would do  for  all dairy  products  once  the
Uruguay Round Agreement  was finally reached.
NAFTA Tariffication  Dispute
This dispute  involved  a complex interrelationship  of the  CUSTA,
the  NAFTA, the  GATT,  and the WTO  Agreement  on Agriculture.  In early
1990, informal discussions took place between the United States and Mexico
to create a bilateral United States-Mexico  free trade agreement or to extend
the  CUSTA  to  include  Mexico.  A commitment  eventually  was  made  to
begin negotiations  on the NAFTA in June  1991. While Canada,  the  United
States, and Mexico were negotiating their trilateral deal, the Final Act, which
contained the  legal text for the GATT,  was tabled  in Geneva  in December
1991.  Over the  next  two  years,  there were  major  struggles  in the  GATT
negotiating  process.  Agriculture,  services,  market  access,  anti-dumping
rules,  and the proposed creation of a new trade institution were  sore points.
At times, agricultural trade liberalization appeared to be an insurmountable
objective.  Canada  also  was  in  a  difficult  position.  While  extolling  the
benefits of free trade in support of its red meats, grains and oilseeds sectors,
it defended its protectionist  supply management systems for dairy,  poultry,
and eggs.
NAFTA negotiations  concluded in August  1992.  Because of slow
progress  on agricultural trade  reform at the  GATT negotiations,  the three
NAFTA parties agreed to construct a series of bilateral arrangements.  The
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provisions  of Chapter  7 of the  CUSTA,  which  stipulated  Canadian  rights
with  respect  to  supply  management,  remained  operative  between  Canada
and the United States.  Canada and the United States then negotiated separate
arrangements  with  Mexico  regarding  market  access.  Canada  and Mexico
eliminated  all  barriers  to  agricultural  trade  except  in  dairy,  poultry,  and
eggs.
The  simultaneous  GATT  negotiations  solidified  the  notion  of
converting  all  non-tariff barriers  to  tariffs,  including  import  quotas  that
were  allowable  for supply-managed  industries  under Article  XI.  Canada
was forced to concede Article XI on  15 December  1993 when an agreement
was  finally  reached.  However,  the  agreement  provided  a  level  of  tariff
protection  to  Canada  previously  provided  by  import  quota  restrictions.
Therefore,  there was no risk of import competition  for the supply-managed
industries  at that time. Even  with the required percentage  reductions in the
tariffs  (see Table  3), there  was no threat to  these sectors  as  a result  of the
agreement other than the gradually increasing minimum access requirements
(see Table 4).
There were a number of key elements to this new GATT agreement
for the agricultural  sector.  First,  all non-tariff barriers would be converted
to tariffs.  It was agreed that a country would reduce its tariffs by an average
of 36  percent over  six years.  During the  same period,  the  total aggregate
measure  of support would  be reduced by 20  percent.  The value of export
subsidies would be reduced by 36 percent,  and the total volume of subsidized
exports  would  drop  by  21percent.  Once  the  tariff equivalents  and  final
figures  for market  access  were  tabled,  the  agreement  was  signed  in
Marrakesh,  Morocco  and came into effect on  15 April  1994.
On 2 February  1995 the United States requested consultations  with
Canada  pursuant  to  Article  2006(4)  of the  NAFTA  concerning  the
Government  of Canada's  application  of customs  duties higher than  those
specified  in  the  NAFTA  to  certain  agricultural  goods  that are  within  the
meaning of NAFTA.  After failing to  resolve the  matter,  on  14 July  1995,
the United  States  Trade  Representative  Michael  Kantor,  requested  the
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establishment  of an arbitral panel pursuant to NAFTA  article 2008.  In its
submission, the United States identified  as the subject matter of the dispute
...the duties being applied by the Government of Canada  ... to
certain agricultural  goods (generally dairy, poultry,  eggs,
barley and margarine, including products thereof) that are
originating  goods as defined in the North American Free Trade
Agreement ...
The  goods  at  issue  were  specified  in  detail  by  reference  to  the  relevant
Harmonized Commodity Description on Coding System  number in a  10 July
1995  letter from the United States Trade Representative to Roy MacLaren,  the
Canadian  Minister  of International  Trade.  The  goods identified  in this  letter
included  milk,  yogurt,  buttermilk,  whey, butter,  and other milk fats  and oils,
cheeses,  curd,  ice  cream  and  other preparations  containing  milk  and  milk
products.
The  United States contended  that Canada was  applying,  with respect  to
over-quota  imports  of these goods from the United States,  tariffs in excess of
those  agreed to by Canada under the NAFTA.  The  United States alleged that
Canada increased its tariffs on some of the goods in question on 1 January  1995
and on the remainder  of the goods on  1 August  1995,  contrary to its NAFTA
undertakings.
Canada did not dispute the fact of its imposition of tariffs with respect to
over-quota  imports  of certain  goods  originating  from the United  States from
January  1, 1995.  However, where the United States characterized  the Canadian
action as  an increase  in tariffs contrary  to the NAFTA,  Canada acknowledged
only that it established tariff-rate quotas for the agricultural products in question.
Canada maintained  it was required to establish these tariffs by the Agreement
on Agriculture concluded in the context of the Marrakesh Agreement establishing
the WTO.  By  a  letter jointly signed  by  their Trade  Representatives  on  21
September 1995, the United States and Canada agreed on the terms of reference
for the dispute  settlement Panel in accordance  with Rule 4 of the Model Rules
and NAFTA Article 2012.
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The central contention of the United States regarding the tariffication issue
is  that Canada  applied  tariffs  to  over-quota  imports  of specified  agricultural
products  of U.S.-origin  contrary to its commitments  under the NAFTA.  In the
submission of the United States, these over-quota tariff rates were described as
"significantly  in excess  of the NAFTA  bound  rate of  duty  and  significantly
above the rate in existence on 31  December  1993."
The United States invoked NAFTA Article 302(1) and (2), which provides:
1.  Except  as otherwise provided in this Agreement,  no Party may
increase  any existing customs duty, or adopt any customs duty, on
an originating good.
2.  Except  as otherwise provided in this Agreement,  each Party shall
progressively eliminate  its customs duties on originating goods in
accordance  with its Schedule to Annex 302.2.
The United States contended that Canada's conversion of import quotas
to tariffs  constituted a breach of NAFTA Article  302(1).  Existing customs
duties were those, which, pursuant to NAFTA Article 201(1), were "in effect
on  the date of entry into force of this Agreement".  Any increase  in tariffs
above  the rate  in effect on  31  December  1993-the  day preceding  the entry
into  force  of the  NAFTA  on  January  1, 1994.  By  creating  new  tariffs,
therefore,  Canada was  in violation  of Article 302(1).
Canada maintained that, while it imposed tariffs on over-quota imports
of specified United States origin  goods in the period in question, the tariffs
were imposed in consequence  of an obligation  to tariffy existing non-tariff
barriers to  trade in the goods  in question pursuant to the WTO Agreement
on Agriculture.  This agreement  entered into force between Canada and the
United States on 1 January  1995.  The tariffs applied  to over-quota imports
of U.S.-origin goods were therefore measures equivalent in protective effect
to  the  non-tariff  barriers  that  had  been  applied  to  the  U.S.-origin  goods
prior to the period  in question rather than new restrictions  on imports.
Canada also  contended that,  under  the NAFTA, the  disputing Parties
agreed  that  in-quota  trade  in  agricultural  goods  between  them  would
continue  to be  governed  by the  regime established  by the  Canada-United
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States Free Trade Agreement.  Over-quota trade would be governed by the
arrangements  that would emerge  from the Uruguay  Round.  As the  tariffs
were  imposed pursuant to the  WTO Agreement  on Agriculture  obligation
to convert existing non-tariff barriers into tariff equivalents,  their application
to  the  trade  in  agricultural  goods  between  Canada  and the  United  States
was  consistent  with  the  Parties'  commitments  under  the  NAFTA.  This
challenge  was  the first test of the dispute  settlement mechanism  agreed to
in  the  NAFTA.  This  challenge  was  likely  sparked  by  increasingly
disgruntled  dairy  producer  groups  in  the  United  States  who  looked
northward and saw  their Canadian counterparts receiving  higher prices for
raw milk  (Matte,  1997).  On 2 December  1996,  the Arbitral  Panel  created
to adjudicate the disputed determined that Canadian tariffs conformed fully
to the provisions of the NAFTA.  The Panel concluded that the intention of
the Parties  was  that FTA Article  710  was  not limited in  its  application to
the  GATT  agreements  negotiated  under  the  GATT  as  they  existed  at the
time that the FTA or the NAFTA entered into force.
GATT/WTO  Dispute: Canada's  Classified and Two-Tiered  Export
Pricing
Before  1995,  the  proceeds  of levies paid  by producers  were  used to
fund  the  Canadian  Dairy  Commission's  losses  from  exporting  dairy
surpluses.  Following the signing of the WTO Agreement  on  15 April  1994,
the  Canadian  Dairy  Commission  (CDC)  developed  alternatives  to  these
producer  levies.  With this  in  mind,  a  Dairy  Industry  Strategic  Planning
Committee was established.  The Canadian Dairy Commission chaired this
Committee and provided research and secretariat support for it.  In October
1994,  the  Committee  recommended  the  implementation  of  a classified
pricing  system based  on  the end use of milk,  national pooling  of market
returns,  and  coordinated  milk allocation mechanisms.
A  Negotiating  Subcommittee  of  the  Canadian  Milk  Supply
Management  Committee  was  established,  with  representation  from  all
provinces,  to  resolve  how  to  implement  a  "special  milk classes"  scheme.
This subcommittee presented its recommendations to federal and provincial
Ministers  of Agriculture in December  1994, who agreed that some form of
pooling  of milk returns was  urgently required  to enable the dairy industry
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to meet Canada's international obligations  and changing market conditions.
Ministers  also  agreed  that  the  CDC Act  should  be  amended  to  allow  the
Commission  to  administer  the  Special  Milk Classes  permit  and  national
pooling arrangements.  The necessary  amendments were passed in July 1995.
The  Special  Milk Classes  Scheme  replaced  the producer-financed  levy
system that was eliminated in 1995, is embodied in a Comprehensive Agreement
on  Special  Class  Pooling.  The  CDC,  the provincial producer  boards  and the
provinces that participate in the National Milk Marketing Plan are the signatories
of the Comprehensive Agreement on Special Class Pooling that became effective
on  1  August  1995.
Under Canada's  national classified pricing  system, the pricing  of milk is
based upon the end use to which the milk is put by processors  as discussed in
the  Background  section  above.  In  1997,  New  Zealand  and the United  States
argued before the WTO that Canada unfairly prices milk used for export markets.
New Zealand and the United States claimed the Canadian two-tier pricing policy
indirectly  subsidizes  exports  thus  violating Article  10  of the Uruguay  Round
Agreement commitment on subsidy reduction.  Under the old program, Canadian
farmers  paid  an  in-quota  levy  to finance  export  subsidies.  Export  subsidies
allowed Canada to sell dairy products on the world market at a lower price than
could be realized domestically.  Under the new program, farmers accept a lower
price for milk used to make products destined for export markets than for milk
sold domestically in Canada.  The returns for both types of sales are pooled into
one payment  to all farmers.
With the new pricing program, Canada has not increased its subsidies but
dairy exports  have  expanded.  The  important  difference  between  the old  and
new pricing schemes in Canada is that the old program would have been subject
to export subsidy disciplines,  while  Canada considered the new program to be
consistent with the  Uruguay Round Agreement.
The source of contention between the nations involved was that while
the World Trade Agreement included producer funded levies as export subsidies,
it made no reference  to two-tiered or classified pricing systems.  The Canadian
position was that a two-tier pricing system is consistent with the commitments
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of the World  Trade Organization.  The position of the complainants  was that
Canada  circumvented  the Uruguay  Round limits on export  subsidies  with its
two-tier  price  system.  Producer  groups  in the  United  States  initiated  a  301
process that lead to the formation of a WTO panel to resolve the dispute.4 The
panel began hearings in March  1998.
On 17 March  1999 the WTO panel made its findings public.  The panel
decided the system of providing low-cost milk to processors is an export subsidy.
Specifically,  the decision  affected  Class  5d and  5e,  which  provide  milk  to
processors at less than domestic prices only if they promise to export the product.
For the 1997-98 dairy year, the volume of milk sold in class 5d and 5e represented
9.64% of total milk production in Canada.  The panel ruled that "basically the
way  Canada  is  administering  those classes  and  the way  the  government
intervenes in those classes are such that based on the definition in the Agreement
on Agriculture,  they should be considered  export subsidies."  In other words,
when  the  domestic  price  is  set above  the  price  charged  for exports,  while
domestic producers are paid an average or pooled price, exports are implicitly
subsidized.
The  panel  also ruled  that  Canada's  limitation  of fluid  milk imports
under the tariff rate quota system to cross border shopping only, was inconsistent
with its obligations under the WTO.  At issue was the way in which the tariff
rate quota for fluid milk is administered.  The burden of proof is on Canada to
demonstrate  that  it is  meeting  its  tariff rate quota  commitment.  This  is  the
problem.  The volume of fluid imports  arising from cross border shopping is
not transparent.
In July 1999, Canada appealed the panel decision to the WTO Appellate
Body.  The Appellate Body upheld the previous decision regarding the two-tier
pricing  system.  It also ruled that Canada  could continue  to limit imports  of
fluid milk under the  TRQ to cross border purchases by Canadian consumers.
4  Section 301  of the Trade Act of 1974, as amended,  permits the United States Trade
Representative  to investigate  and sanction countries  whose trade practices  are deemed
"unfair" to U.S. interests.  It contains  both mandatory  and discretionary  provisions and
specific timetables for the United States Trade Representative  to take action.
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On  23 December  1999,  Canada,  the United  States, and New Zealand
jointly announced the terms under which Canada's subsidized exports of dairy
products  will  be reduced.  Under  the  agreement,  Canada  will immediately
comply  with its WTO export  subsidy commitments  on butter,  skimmed milk
powder,  and other dairy products.  Moreover,  Canada has committed to reduce
substantially the amount of milk made available to cheese producers during the
remainder  of the  current  marketing year  (ending July  30,  2000)  and to  cease
issuing permits  for  such milk  on 31  March  2000.  Beginning in the 2000/01
marketing  year (Aug./July),  Canada will not be able to export more than 9,076
tons  of cheese.  This total  is less  than  half of the volume  exported  in recent
years.
SUMMARY  AND  CONCLUSIONS
The purpose of this paper  was to review  dairy  disputes related  to the
NAFTA  with the  objective  of describing  the context in  which these disputes
have  occurred  and will likely continue  to arise.  The  similarities  of U.S.  and
Canadian dairy policies is striking: both countries use intervention prices, border
protection  (via  tariff rate  quotas)  and  export  subsidies  to maintain  domestic
prices well above world market levels. Both countries use sophisticated classified
pricing  schemes  to  price  discriminate  against  consumers  of products  with
relatively  more  inelastic  demands  and use the resulting  revenue enhancement
to enhance  average  farm  milk prices.  This  biggest differences  between  U.S.
and Canadian dairy  interventions  concern  the level of intervention  (Canadian
classified prices are about 50 percent higher than U.S. classified prices, butter/
skim milk powder intervention prices and over quota import tariffs are generally
higher than those in the United States), the use of production  quotas, and the
associated  two-tiered  export  pricing  scheme  implemented  to  ease internal
pressures  to increase  Canadian production quotas.
The paper described three dairy trade disputes that ranged more broadly
than just the  NAFTA:  the  GATT ice cream  and yogurt dispute;  the NAFTA
tariffication  dispute;  and the  GATT/WTO  dispute concerning  Canada's  two-
tier  pricing  system  for  raw  milk.  These  disputes  figure  prominently  in  the
historical  evolution of agricultural trade dispute resolution mechanisms under
the  GATT,  the NAFTA  and  the  Uruguay  Round  GATT  agreements  as  each
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represented one of the earliest implementations of these mechanisms  under the
alternative trade  liberalizations.
Unfortunately,  solid economic analyses of the impacts of these dispute
resolutions in the dairy sector are scarce.  In contrast to the livestock and grains
disputes  analysed in those  case studies,  the evidence  is strong  that the North
American  dairy  sectors  have  not developed  the  constructive,  cross-border
dialogues  on trade  disputes that  characterize  these other agricultural  sectors.
Cross-border university  collaborations  are perhaps  particularly  well suited  to
providing  economic  benchmark  analyses  within  which  a  more  solid
understanding of the impacts of dairy trade disputes can be realized. Given the
heavy politicizing that distorts much of the cross-border dairy dispute dialogues,
multi-country,  "third party" economic analyses could do much to help improve
these dialogues - assuming the respective disputants don't shoot the messengers.
This remains  an  increasingly  important  and  more urgent  agenda  for further
research  and cross-border collaboration.
The history of dairy trade disputes suggests that, in each case, the dispute
resolution  mechanism  operated  as  intended  though  the  smoothness  (and
timeliness)  of the resolution process improved with each succeeding  round of
liberalization.  These  case studies should  provide some comfort to those who
espouse the reasonableness  of this type of resolution dispute process.  As well,
with  feedback  from  the  major  players  (farm,  processor  and  perhaps  even
consumer groups) on both sides of the border, suggestions for further improving
the evolution of these dispute resolution processes/mechanisms  is  warranted.
Hopefully,  the discussions  at these  workshops,  and  the  distribution  of their
results, will further these cross-border  collaborative  agendas.
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1986  May / June
September
1988  January 2
March 25
Event
Canadian Dairy  Commission established.
Market  Sharing Quota (MSQ) plan for industrial milk.
Canadian Dairy Commission  for the first time pays a
direct  subsidy on all MSQ shipments.
Direct subsidy capped at $6.03/hL.
Introduction  of cheese import quota of 22,727
tonnes.
Cheese import quota reduced to 20,400 tonnes.
(CDC annual report  states  'other than casein,
buttermilk powder and some dairy product mixed
in combinations  with other products  such as
animal feed, the only other import allowed during
this period was cheese under quota.')
Import controls on cheese, casein, animal feed,
whole milk powder, skim milk powder,  buttermilk
powder and evaporated  and condensed  milk.
Cheese  import quota 20,400 tonnes (60% EC)
Sweetened condensed milk 25,800 tonnes
(Australia)
Buttermilk  powder 907 tonnes (New Zealand)
Casein - permits issued upon request,  no casein
production  in Canada
Butter - only permits are issued when there has
been  insufficient production of milk
Dry skim milk, dry whole milk and dry whey - may
not be imported
Products which are blends or mixtures of at least 50%
dairy products become subject to import control
Free Trade negotiations  begin.
Uruguay  Round negotiations begin.
Free Trade Agreement signed.
A notice to importers states that import permits are
required for any imports of ice cream and yogurt.  The
notice was issued pursuant to the Canadian Export
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and Import Permits Act.  It required importers  seeking
permits for any of the restricted products  for the
remainder of 1988  to document their import
performance with respect to these products  in 1984,
1985,  1986 and  1987.  No quota levels were
established for 1988.  Permits were requested for 3,536
tonnes of ice cream and for 2,279 tonnes of yogurt.
Permits were issued for 349 tonnes of ice cream and
for 1,212 tonnes  of yogurt.
Sept.  7 / Oct.  7  United States  and Canada hold consultations
pursuant to GATT Article XXII on quantitative
restrictions imposed by Canada on imports of ice
cream and yogurt products.
December 8  The United States requests a Dispute Panel  to
examine the quantitative  restrictions  imposed by
Canada on imports of ice cream and yogurt products
under GATT Article XXIII:2.
December 20  A GATT Council agrees  to establish a panel on the
ice cream and yogurt  matter.
1989  January  1  Free Trade Agreement  enters into force.
January  17  A Notice to Importers is issued which established
annual global quotas for calendar year 1989  as
follows:
(a) ice cream, ice milk,  ice cream mix,  ice milk
mix or any product manufactured mainly of ice
cream or ice milk - 345 tonnes
(b) yogurt - 330 tonnes
The notice further stated that the main criterion for
determining  the size of quota allocated to individual
importers would be the documented level of their
imports during  1985,  1986  and 1987.  Some
quantities could, however, be made available  for
new importers.  Individual  import permits are required
for each shipment and are issued through  an on-line
automated  system.  Permits normally have a validity
period of 30 days around the date of arrival specified
by importers (5  days prior to and 24 after), but are
charged to the importers'  quota allocations  only if
they are used.
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May 11/Jul.  17
1990  September  12
1991  June
1992  December  17
1993  December  15
1994  January  1








Dispute Panel meets with parties from Canada and
the United States regarding the dispute over ice
cream and yogurt.
The Dispute Panel concluded that Canada's
restrictions on the importation of ice cream and yogurt
are inconsistent with Article XI: 1 and cannot be justified
under the provisions  of Article XI:2(c)(i).  In particular,
the Panel found that ice cream and yogurt do not meet
the requirements  of Article XI:2(c)(i) for <<like products>>
«in any form>> to Canadian raw milk because they do
not compete directly with raw milk nor would their free
importation be likely to render ineffective  the Canadian
measures on raw milk production.  The Panel found
further that the restriction of imports of ice cream and
yogurt is not necessary to the enforcement  of the
Canadian program for raw milk.
North American Free Trade Agreement  negotiations
begin.
North American Free Trade Agreement  signed.
Uruguay Round Negotiations  conclude.
North American Free Trade Agreement  enters into
force.
World Trade Organization  Agreement enters into
force.
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Low rate tariff quota commitments are applicable  to
the following products  and quantities:
Product  Tariff Quota
Fluid Milk  64,500 tonnes
Cream - Not
Concentrated  394 tonnes
Concentrated
or Condensed
Milk or Cream  11.7 tonnes
Butter  1,964 tonnes
3,274 tonnes
Cheese  20,412 tonnes
Yogurt  332 tonnes
Ice Cream  429 tonnes
484 tonnes
Powdered
Buttermilk  908 tonnes
Dry Whey  3,198  tonnes

















The United States requests consultations  with
Canada pursuant  to Article 2006(4) of the North
American  Free Trade Agreement  concerning
Canada's  application of customs duties higher than
those specified in the NAFTA.
The United States Trade  Representative  Michael
Kantor requests the establishment of an arbitral
panel pursuant to NAFTA Article 2008.
Direct subsidy  payment reduced by  15%  to $4.62/hL
New milk class pricing and pooling system
implemented.
Option Export Program introduced  wherein a milk
volume of up to 5% of total industrial and fluid
quota holdings  in a province and up to  10%  of
an individual producer's quota holdings can be
made available for approved export activities.
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1996  March  22 The disputing  parties provide the arbitral panel with
written submissions.  The central contention of the
United States is that Canada is applying tariffs to
over-quota  imports of dairy products of US origin
contrary  to its commitments under the NAFTA.
Canada contends that, while it imposed tariffs on
over-quota  imports on US origin  dairy products, the
tariffs were imposed in consequence  of an obligation
to tariffy existing non-tariff barriers  to trade  in the
goods in question pursuant to the WTO Agreement
on Agriculture,  which entered into force January  1,
1995.
April  Quebec  producers  vote not to implement the
Optional Export Program in that province.
August  1  Direct subsidy reduced  15%  to $3.80/hL.
December  2  Final report of the arbitral panel.  The Panel decides
that FTA Article 710 has the effect of bringing  into
the NAFTA the replacement  regime for agricultural
non-tariff barriers  that was established  under the
WTO.  This consists of an obligation not to introduce
or maintain such non-tariff barriers and the right to
apply the tariffs that resulted from tariffication,  as set
out in their tariff schedules to over-quota imports of
agricultural products, together with the obligation to
reduce those tariffs and ensure certain minimum
volumes of imports.  The Panel decided NAFTA
Article  302(1) did not diminish these rights.
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